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25X1 French-African Community: The bid by Ivory Coast and three other West African Community states for independence within the Community without prior commitments as to future ties with France poses a major challenge to this institution, which embraces ten states in Africa and the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar). There are signs that De Gaulle will accede to the bid.

[] This would almost certainly hasten the Community's evolution toward a still looser association. Should De Gaulle reject the bid, the four states have threatened to become independent outside the Community, as did Guinea in 1958. However, none of the territories concerned could afford a complete rupture with France on the Guinea model, and none desires it. []
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III. THE WEST

25X1 [France: Jules Moch, France's delegate at the ten-nation disarmament talks, has described the new Soviet disarmament plan as essentially a good one which he hopes to accept for further negotiation if the "little bad in it" can be removed. Moch admitted that there was disagreement between President de Gaulle and the French Foreign Ministry on disarmament policy, and his statements imply that De Gaulle's views are close to his own. Moch, who has often acted in a freewheeling manner on disarmament matters over Foreign Ministry objections, will leave for Paris this week end in an effort to sell his views to the Foreign Ministry. []

25X1 [Cyprus: Negotiations continue to be stalled over questions regarding British bases on the island. Archbishop Makarios insists that Britain specifically agree that bases be transferred to Cyprus if the British abandon them. Britain has refused, fearing that the Cypriots would begin early attempts to force the British out. The impasse could delay the formal grant of independence for Cyprus this summer. The British Parliament, which must pass independence-enabling legislation, is scheduled to recess at the end of July. The new regime in Turkey has announced it will abide by all agreements reached thus far and is seeking a formula to break the present deadlock. []
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DAILY BRIEF

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Finland: The failure of President Kekkonen last week to replace the minority Agrarian cabinet with an Agrarian-led majority coalition probably eliminates the prospects for any early Finnish affiliation with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The USSR had hinted to the Finns that it would agree to Finland's affiliating with the EFTA if, in return, the USSR could get a commitment from a broadly based Finnish government that would assure Finnish trade ties with the USSR for a longer period than the present five-year pact.

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DAILY BRIEF

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France's Community Concept Challenged

Four West African states of the French Community which follow the leadership of Ivory Coast Premier Houphouet-Boigny have posed a major challenge to France's concept of this institution. The four--Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey--have requested immediate independence within the Community without prior commitments on their part as to future ties with France.

As originally launched last year, the Community was a close-knit association linking under one sovereignty France and 12 autonomous Black African states. Its constitution has just been revised to permit the African states formal independence without sacrificing their membership in the Community. Paris has insisted, however, that negotiations for independence be accompanied by the simultaneous negotiation of wide-ranging bilateral "cooperation accords" designed to preserve intimate links between France and the African members.

Mali and the Malagasy Republic--the first two Community states to invoke the new option--initialed such accords in early April and have been expected to complete action on them immediately after becoming independent this summer. Houphouet's four-state group, in contrast, has indicated it will discuss such accords only after its members have obtained their independence and been admitted, separately, into the UN. They have threatened, should this procedure be denied them, to become independent outside the Community, as did Guinea in 1958. However, none of the territories involved desires a rupture with France on the Guinea model.

The American Embassy in Paris believes the group's move was prompted by Houphouet's inability to secure from De Gaulle assurances that the four states--which have been the most loyal to France--would have a preferred status within the "renovated" Community. [Houphouet's chief lieutenant in Abidjan, however, claims that the move was motivated by a restrictive French]

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[] interpretation of the legal competence of independent African members of the Community to enter into direct economic relationships with other countries. He cited as a further reason Houphouet's desire to facilitate Guinea's reassociation with the other states of the old federation of French West Africa. [] There have recently been indications of a possible rapprochement between Houphouet and Guinea's President Sekou Touré.

Indications that De Gaulle may accede to Houphouet's demands suggest a further rapid evolution of the Community toward a still looser association. The four Equatorial African states, which are about to claim their independence, now may insist on following Houphouet's lead. Mali and the Malagasy Republic might then have second thoughts about their own arrangements with France.

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France May Press for New Western Disarmament Proposal

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The US disarmament delegate at Geneva credits as accurate a report that French delegate Jules Moch said the new Soviet disarmament plan is acceptable as the basis for further negotiation if the "little bad in it" can be eliminated. Moch reportedly stated that he intends to use every device at his command to prevent the US from "torpedoing" the Soviet plan. He urged that if the short period left before US national elections prohibited the US from being a party to a new Western proposal, either the other four Western powers should frame a new plan without US participation or the Soviet plan should be accepted with modifications.

Admitting that President de Gaulle and the Foreign Ministry disagree on disarmament policy, Moch implied that his views were close to those of De Gaulle and said he was going to Paris this week end to sell his views to the Foreign Ministry. He plans to return to Geneva and speak at the ten-nation meeting on Monday.

Moch has been France's chief disarmament negotiator since 1952 and, in his desire to bridge Western and Soviet positions, has often acted without reference either to Allied or Foreign Ministry positions. Nevertheless, his general views on disarmament, especially his interest in control and elimination of vehicles capable of carrying nuclear weapons, have apparently been accepted by De Gaulle, who publicly expressed similar views on 31 May. In view of De Gaulle's tendency to overrule Foreign Ministry advice, the ministry may be able only to delay temporarily an official French proposal at Geneva for a new Western initiative on disarmament along the lines of the latest Soviet plan.

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Cyprus Negotiations Continue Stalled Over Future of
British Bases

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[Negotiations between Archbishop Makarios and the British are again deadlocked, this time by Makarios' insistence that Britain's bases on the island be transferred to Cyprus if Britain ever withdraws from them. The archbishop has the support of the Greek Government on this issue. The British are refusing to make such an agreement formally, fearing that the Cypriot Government would begin early attempts to force them out. Furthermore, the British suspect that once they concede on this issue Makarios will raise another one, insisting, as he has with this one, that the entire future of the agreements hinges on the new point. Other unsettled matters are the wording of the British statement regarding the administration of the bases, their exact boundaries, and the amount of British financial aid.

[Both Britain and Turkey believe that if an agreement on all issues is not reached soon, the British Parliament's recess at the end of July will end the chances for independence this summer. Parliament must pass enabling legislation before independence is final. Makarios appears to be unconcerned over this deadline.

[Cypriot Vice President Kuchuk and President of the Federation of Turkish Associations Denktash recently went to Ankara to consult with the new Turkish regime regarding the Cyprus situation. Ankara has agreed to respect all agreements reached thus far and is seeking a formula to break the present impasse. Turkey, according to a report from the US Embassy, accepts the necessity of the transfer of the bases to Cypriot sovereignty should Britain abandon them, but will propose, after approval by the provisional cabinet at Ankara, that actual transfer must be effected by agreement of all signatories of the Zurich-London agreements on Cypriot independence. Turkey hopes to persuade Athens and London to accept this formula and then to bring Makarios "to reason" in time to achieve independence this summer.

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Finnish Affiliation With European Free Trade Association
Now Unlikely

25X1 President Kekkonen's failure last week to replace Finland's minority Agrarian government with an Agrarian-led majority coalition probably makes it impossible for Finland to join the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) at any early date.

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According to Conservative party chairman Hetemaki, who was involved in the attempt to form a coalition government, "the Russians wanted a broader based government" in order to nail down Finnish commitments under a possible new trade agreement. Moscow had hinted to the Finns that it would agree to Finland's affiliating with the EFTA if, in return, Finland would accept a trade agreement for a longer period than the present five-year pact. In 1959 the USSR accounted for approximately 18 percent of Finland's foreign trade.

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